Western New England Law Review
Volume 9 9 (1987)
Issue 1

Article 9

1-1-1987

LAWYERS AND PROFESSIONAL
AUTONOMY: REFLECTIONS ON
CORPORATE LAWYERING AND THE
DOCTRINE OF INFORMED CONSENT
Mark Spiegel

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview
Recommended Citation
Mark Spiegel, LAWYERS AND PROFESSIONAL AUTONOMY: REFLECTIONS ON CORPORATE LAWYERING AND THE
DOCTRINE OF INFORMED CONSENT, 9 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 139 (1987), http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview/vol9/
iss1/9

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Review & Student Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New England
University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Western New England Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons
@ Western New England University School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.

LAWYERS AND PROFESSIONAL AUTONOMY:
REFLECTIONS ON CORPORATE
LAWYERING AND THE DOCTRINE OF
INFORMED CONSENT
MARK SPIEGEL

*

Professor Jay Katz's book The Silent World of Doctor and Pa
tient! continues his exploration of decisionmaking between doctors
and patients. He argues that the doctrine of informed consent has been
so far only a fiction or mirage,2 but that it can develop into a viable
principle committed to shared decisionmaking between doctors and
their patients. For this to happen, we have to understand the historical
and psychological barriers to increasing patient participation in deci
sionmaking. The book is, therefore, devoted to considering these barri
ers, particularly the psychological ones.
Much of what Professor Katz says is relevant to lawyers. In this
article, however, I am not going to consider in general the question
whether the doctrine of informed consent should be applied to lawyers
or what the current state of the law is. I have attempted to do this
elsewhere. 3 Neither am I going to discuss the historical or psychologi
cal barriers to its implementation. What I wish to discuss in this arti
cle is whether there are differences between doctors and lawyers that
might create additional barriers or reasons against the application of
informed consent to lawyers even if one accepts, as I do, most of Pro
fessor Katz's arguments as they apply to doctors.
The difference I will focus on can be illustrated by a story that
* Associate Professor of Law, Boston College Law School; A.B., University of
Michigan, 1965; J.D., University of Chicago, 1968.
I. J. KATZ, THE S!LENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984) [hereinafter
KATZ].
2. See also Katz, Informed Consent-A Fairy Tale? Law's Vision, 39 U. PITT. L.
REV. 137 (1977); Schultz, From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New Protected In
terest, 95 YALE LAW J. 219 (1985).
3. Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the Legal
Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 41 (1979) [hereinafter Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Deci
sionmaking]; Spiegel, The New Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Lawyer-Client Deci
sion Making and the Role of Rules in Structuring the Lawyer-Client Dialogue, 1980 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 1003.
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Professor Katz relates in his book. Katz tells us about a conversation
he had with a successful businessman at a dinner party. The business
man became increasingly angry as he described his experiences with
doctors during treatment of a mysterious illness. Katz said to the busi
nessman, "I think I know what makes you angry. You are a person
whom everybody treats with considerable respect. Yet, once you en
tered the hospital, everybody from young interns on up called you by
your first name, while they expected you to address them as 'doctor' "
(p. 211). The businessman then told Katz "about the difficulties he
had experienced in conversing with his doctors on the basis of mutual
respect" and about how childlike his doctors made him feel (p. 211).
Assuming this story is representative, it illustrates how the pro
fessional doctor retains power over a patient regardless of the class and
status of the patient. 4 In law, however, there is an increasing body of
literature which argues that the status of the client matters. To be
more precise, the argument is that large corporate clients exercise con
trol over their lawyers rather than vice versa.
The argument for the development of informed consent is based
on the assumption that the professional doctor or lawyer exercises
control over the professional-client decisionmaking process, and that
normal rules of contracting are not sufficient to protect the patient's or
client's interests. Therefore, a legal rule must be created if one wants
to preserve patient or client control over decisionmaking. If, however,
in a large and significant part of the legal profession clients control
their lawyers, is the doctrine of informed consent needed? Moreover, if
the actions of powerful clients can harm third parties, would the appli
cation of informed consent to lawyer-client relations have harmful ef
fects? This article discusses these questions by first examining the
argument that corporate lawyers lack professional autonomy and then
considering what its implications are for applying a rule of informed
consent to lawyers. 5
4. Wealth, of course, is not irrelevant. It buys more and probably better health care
as well as more deference. The point is that wealth does not, by itself, eliminate profes
sional control.
5. The terms control and autonomy do not have one unique definition. See Nelson,
Ideology, Practice, and Professional Autonomy: Social Values and Client Relationships in the
Large Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REV. 503,506-07 (1985). Within the lawyer-client relation
ship one can discuss autonomy with regard to who controls the means (the way the lawyer
ing work is performed) or the ends (the goals the client seeks). See infra pp. 141-46.
Moreover control is not an all or nothing proposition. Lawyers can influence or persuade
clients without having the power to make the final decision about either means or ends.
Similarly, although lawyers might have control over an issue, clients can influence the law
yer or make the lawyer deal with issues that are important for the client. See Sarat &
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I.

Laypersons may have always believed that lawyers are controlled
by their clients. Academics, however, have tried to demonstrate that
despite this popular mythology, lawyers as professionals exercise con
siderable control over their clients. 6 It is only recently that scholars
have developed the thesis that corporate lawyers are controlled by
their clients and therefore do not fit the classic definition of a
professional. 7
John Heinz and Edward Laumann conducted a major empirical
study of the Chicago Bar. 8 The purpose of the study was to analyze
the social differentiation among segments of the Chicago Bar and eval
uate the means by which this differentiation was converted into ine
quality of things such as income and prestige within the legal
profession. 9 The concluding chapter of the study, however, also dis
cussed the question of professional autonomy. In this chapter Heinz
and Laumann argued that while lawyers who primarily represent indi
vidual clients have professional autonomy, corporate lawyers do not. \0
Their argument is based on two related sets of propositions. First,
although corporate lawyers may have high social status and be among
the most prestigious and best educated lawyers, their power and stand
ing in society is modest compared to their clients. Second, and more
important, corporate lawyering is a "patronage" profession heavily de
pendent on its clients to maintain its business.!! Therefore, corporate
lawyers are unlikely to disagree with their clients because of the fear of
losing business.
Felstiner, Law and Strategy in the Divorce Lawyer's Office, 20 LAW & Soc. REV. 93, 129-30
(1986).
6. See, e.g., D. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE? (1974);
Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking, supra note 3; Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Pro
fessionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUMAN RIGHTS 9 (1975).
7. See J. HEINZ & E. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF
THE BAR (1982); The Corporate Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REV. 271 (1985). But see Rues
chemeyer, Doctors and Lawyers: A Comment on the Theory ofthe Professions, I CAN. R. OF
SOC. & ANTHROPOLOGY 17 (1964) (stating the corporate control thesis twenty-two years
ago).
8. J. HEINZ & E. LAUMANN, supra note 7.
9. Id. at 8.
ID. Id. at 355-74. This conclusion is concurred with by several recent studies of the
corporate law firm. See Gordon, Introduction To Symposium On The Corporate Law Firm,
37 STAN. L. REV. 271, 274 (1985) (discussing several of the studies in the symposium and
stating that "[e]ach arrives at the tentative conclusion that outside lawyers on the whole
have neither the opportunity nor the desire to reshape their clients' business or political
goals and chiefly confine their role to that of technical execution.").
II. J. HEINZ & E. LAUMANN, supra note 7, at 359-61.
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Is the argument that Heinz and Laumann advance persuasive?
Heinz acknowledges that the empirical evidence supporting the thesis
of corporate client control is not conclusive. 12 Moreover, the assump
tion of competition does not distinguish corporate lawyers from law
yers engaged in individual representation. 13 In addition, status and
power by themselves do not distinguish lawyering from medicine. Per
haps, however, it is the combination of the two factors-status and
competition-that distinguish corporate lawyering.
In trying to assess whether this combination of status and compe
tition supports the thesis of corporate control, one has to be clear
about why we care about the concept of professional autonomy. Dif
ferent reasons for being concerned about professional autonomy will
result in different definitions of lawyer autonomy, and different defini
tions of lawyer autonomy will lead to different conclusions as to what
counts as evidence of whether corporate control over lawyers exists.
Traditionally, commentators have defined professional autonomy
as control over how work is performed and evaluated. 14 This auton
omy is thought necessary because the services delivered by the profes
sional involve the application of specialized knowledge. The
consumers of the service lack this specialized knowledge and therefore
they cannot evaluate the services nor determine how they should be
performed. Informed consent challenges this traditional view of the
professional-client relationship by arguing that if the professional is
required to communicate some of his or her specialized knowledge to
the patient or client, lay people can share in the decisionmaking pro
cess and in determining how the professional work is to be performed.
Therefore, what Professor Katz and the proponents of the doctrine of
informed consent are interested in is the allocation of power within the
professional-client relationship.
Heinz and Laumann are not concerned about these questions of
who evaluates professional work and who controls the manner in
which it is accomplished. Heinz, in a lecture given at the University of
Georgia,15 distinguished tactics and goals and argued that the relevant
issue for analyzing the autonomy of lawyers is not whether they con
trol tactics but whether they control the goals that the client seeks.16
What the proponents of corporate control are interested in is the ques
12.
13.

See Heinz, The Power 0/ Lawyers, 17 GA. L. REV. 891, 903-04 (1983).
See generally J. CARLIN, LAWYERS ON THEIR OWN (1962); Nelson, supra note

5, at 506.

14.
IS.
16.

See Nelson, supra note 5, at 506.
Heinz, supra note 12, at 891.
Id. at 897.
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tion of power vis-a-vis the outside world. Therefore, their focus is on
whether the lawyer changes the client's ends.
Given these different views of what counts as professional auton
omy, both the thesis that corporations control their lawyers and the
traditional argument that the corporate lawyer as a professional has
autonomy in doing his or her work free from client scrutiny may be
true. Perhaps, then, the corporate control thesis is irrelevant to the
concerns of informed consent and vice versa. I believe, however, that
despite their different perspectives on autonomy, informed consent
and the corporate control thesis have to contend with each other. The
proponents of the corporate control thesis assume too easily that ends
(or goals) and means (or tactics) can be separated; In so doing, they
ignore the ways in which means can either determine ends or be ends
in and of themselves,l7 On the other hand, proponents of informed
consent, including myself, must contend with the ends of the lawyer
client relationship, particularly the power of corporate clients to do
harm.
A study conducted by Robert L. Nelson has been used to support
the corporate control thesis. IS Nelson asked corporate lawyers
whether they had, at any time in their careers, refused an assignment
from their client because it was contrary to their personal values. Only
36 of 222 corporate lawyers had ever refused assignments. 19 Nelson as
well as Heinz and Laumann concluded that this data supports the ar
gument that corporate lawyers do not exercise autonomy.
Nelson's study illustrates the failure to account for the ways in
which means might determine ends. 20 As Nelson acknowledged, the
question he asked called for an all or nothing response. 21 It did not
17. See generally Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking, supra note 3, at
101-03.
18.

See Nelson, supra note 5; see also Heinz, supra note 12 (discussion of Nelson).
19. Nelson, supra note 5, at 534.
20. There are other difficulties with Nelson's survey. Leaving aside questions of
methodological validity, see id. at 509-11, drawing support for the thesis of corporate con
trol from the Nelson study depends upon interpreting the meaning of the number of refus
als. As Nelson states: is the glass is half full or half empty? [d. at 536. If one assumes that
corporate lawyers and their clients share the same values it is arguable that Nelson's data
reveals a high level of professional control. Nelson's answer to this problem is that because
his data spans the career of his lawyers it illustrates an extraordinarily low incidence of
disagreement. But if one's expectations are that most of the time value disagreements do
not arise and that when they do they are converted into technical issues, Nelson's data can
be seen as the tip of the iceberg illustrating a large degree of lawyer control and autonomy.
Nelson recognizes this objection. He, however, concludes that it does not undermine the
validity of his conclusions.
21.

[d.
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ask for the times when a lawyer influenced the client's decision by
deliberate framing of legal options but asked only for the times the
lawyer refused work. Nelson states that the follow-up probes en
couraged his respondents to report these other, more intermediate,
methods of affecting their clients' decisions but does not tell us how he
accounted for these other "control" devices. 22 Refusing an assignment
appears to be a drastic step.23 Moreover, lawyers are more comforta
ble influencing clients through technical advice. 24 Therefore, one
would expect a significantly higher incidence of these other methods of
control than of outright refusals, but Nelson's study does not discuss
them. 25 Absent this data about these intermediate methods of control,
it is impossible to evaluate whether Nelson's study shows that corpo
rate lawyers lack autonomy, even accepting his specialized definition
of autonomy.
The other problem of ends and means that the corporate control
thesis illustrates is the assumption that the only ends that are signifi
cant are those relating to the outside world. 26 In his book, Professor
Katz discusses the treatment of breast cancer patients (pp. 90-93, 166
84). The agreed upon end is the cure of the cancer. There are at least
two significant problems in deciding what is the appropriate means to
achieve this agreed upon end. One problem stems from medical uncer
22. Id.
23. See Kagan & Rosen, On the Social Significance 0/ Large Law Firm Practice, 37
STAN. L. REV. 399, 430 (1985) (stating that refusing an assignment based on personal
values is a step that calls for "heroism").
24. Indeed, if my own experiences in practice and in teaching have any general appli
cability, it is my guess that lawyers tend to convert "moral" questions into technical ones.
If this is true it is this intermediate category that has to be studied. See G. HAZZARD,
ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 146-49 (1978) (discussion of using peremptory advice,
cast in technical terms; to influence clients).
25. Indeed, it seems plausible to assume that these intermediate modes of influencing
clients are more likely to be successful. Outright refusals of work are more likely to lead to
clients just going to other lawyers. See Sarat & Felstiner, supra note 5 (illustration of this
interrelationship between ends and means in the context of a divorce case). Their article
illustrates how a lawyer's discussion of means, i.e., the uncertainties of the legal process,
leads the client to modify her ends, particularly to abandon her goals of achieving "justice"
and vindication.
26. Heinz supports this assumption by quoting a coal miner's monologue from the
English revue Beyond the Fringe:
You're given complete freedom to do what you like - your absolute free hand ...
provided you get hold of two tons of coal every day. But the method you do it,
you can use any method open to you. Hackin' and hewin' is the normal one....
But hackin' and hewin', as I say, its quite a varied life you have down there.
Heinz, supra note 12, at 897.
Heinz' other reason for his choice of what autonomy means is that his prime concern
is the allocation of resources. Id. However, if lawyers influence clients through intermediate
forms of behavior, see above, then they may influence the allocation of resources.
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tainty. It is unclear which of a variety of treatments ranging from
radiation to radical mastectomy is most likely to achieve this agreed
upon end in a particular situation. Second, the effects of the various
treatments on a woman's sense of self are significant. Professor Katz's
discussion illustrates that given this uncertainty and that different pa
tients will value the effects of the various treatments differently, the
most important decision in the relationship may be the choice of
means. 27
Can the goals of the lawyer-client relationship similarly include
the means selected to achieve the agreed upon ends? I would argue, at
least sometimes, yes. This possibility is clearest with individual clients.
For individual clients, goals such as speed, dignity, reputation, and
cost may be almost, if not equally as important as achieving the pur
ported ends of the relationship.28 Does this change when the client is
a corporation? Certainly concepts such as dignity, autonomy and fear
of testifying do not apply to things such as corporations. On the other
hand, concern about costs 29 and reputation which can depend on the
means selected to achieve the agreed upon ends may be very important
to corporations.
Indeed, anecdotal evidence reveals that there were significant
problems in the relations between corporate lawyers and their clients
caused by overlawyering. Corporate clients allowed their law firms a
significant amount of autonomy to achieve the agreed upon ends and
corporate lawyers used that autonomy, particularly in litigation, to
choose ,strategies regardless of whether they would be cost-effective. 30
Recently that appears to have changed.
One of the most important developments in the structure of the
legal profession over the past five to ten years has been the increasing
reliance on in-house counsel,31 This change affects not only the inter
27. The patient who Professor Katz describes as Iphigenia chose a lumpectomy and
radiation therapy over a mastectomy because of the physical effects of the mastectomy.
KATZ, supra note I, at 91.
28. See Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking, supra note 3, at 101-02.
29. But see Lochner, Comment on Chayes & Chayes, 37 STAN. L. REV. 305, 308
(1985) (costs are not a determinative factor in choosing outside counsel).
30. See M. WESSEL, THE RULE OF REASON: A NEW ApPROACH TO CORPORATE
LITIGATION 126-79 (1976); Goldstein, Business Sees Lawyers as Necessary Evil, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 10, 1977, at D1, col. 2 (panel of businessmen at ABA meeting criticizing high
and unnecessary legal costs. One panelist stated: "Lawyers, especially in New York, travel
like Nuns-in pairs or three at a time."). See also Flaherty, Comparison Shopping Hits the
Law: Companies Cut Costs, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 31, 1983, at 1 (describing use of in-house
counsel to monitor costs).
31. See generally Chayes & Chayes, Corporate Counsel and the Elite Law Firm, 37
STAN. L. REV. 277 (1985).
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nal structure of the corporation, but also the corporation's relations
with and control over outside counsel. In-house counsel is increasingly
performing a monitoring role over the work of outside counsel. 32 In
so doing, they are performing the role of the informed consumer of
legal services who can understand and control the lawyer's work. It is
precisely because of the lack of such informed consumers that critics
have thought informed consent necessary.
Heinz and Laumann may be correct that corporate clients control
their lawyers. If they are correct, however, it is not solely because of
status and competition, but also because of the ability of corporate
clients to monitor and direct the work of their lawyers. It is this ability
to monitor that, at least partially, explains the differences in the power
of the corporate president as the client of a lawyer from the corporate
president as the patient of a doctor.

II.
If we assume, based upon the reasons cited by Heinz and

Laumann and these structural changes in the legal profession, that the
corporate control thesis is plausible, we then tum to the question
posed earlier: if it is true that corporate clients control their lawyers, is
this difference between the legal and medical professions significant?
Does it mean that applying the doctrine of informed consent to law
yers is unnecessary or unwise or both?
The argument that applying informed consent to the legal profes
sion is unnecessary would depend upon showing that the situations
where lawyers control their clients are so significant and numerous
that an informed consent rule would be needed only in a small class of·
cases. This argument by itself, however, does not seem very persua
sive. First, whatever the evidence for corporate clients' control over
their lawyers, there is strong evidence that in the case of individual
representation the opposite is true. 33 Second, even if one considers
individual representation less significant than corporate representa
tion, rules of law are not for the typical case but for the atypical one.
Not every lawyer cheats clients; however, fiduciary duties still apply to
32. Id. at 289-93; see also Flaherty, supra note 30. This action includes both scrutiny
over work performed, and decisions as to whether the work should be performed in-house
or sent to outside counsel. Therefore, for outside law firms competition for business is not
only with other law firms but with in-house counsel.
33. See, e.g., A. BLUMBERG, CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1967); Hosticka, Legal Services
Lawyers Encounter Clients: A Study in Street Level Bureaucracy (June 1976) (unpublished
Ph.D. thesis available in M.I.T. Library); Macaulay, Lawyers and Consumer Protection
Laws, 14 LAW & SOC'y REV. 115 (1979); ROSENTHAL, supra note 6.
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all lawyers. Therefore, the argument that informed consent is unneces
sary depends upon showing not only that informed consent is not
needed in all segments of the legal profession but that there is some
harm caused by its application to the legal profession.
The most significant potential harm results when the decisions
made by lawyers with their clients can harm third parties. 34 This is
not the case with most medical decisions. Applying a rule of informed
consent to lawyers could increase the number of times lawyers partici
pate in or facilitate behavior that harms others. Moreover, the prob
lem of harm to third parties would seem to be most troublesome in the
area of practice where the corporate control thesis applies. It is here
that we have the most powerful clients and hence the largest potential
for public harm. Therefore the proponents of a doctrine of informed
consent for lawyers must contend with not just a tradeoff between au
tonomy and professional prerogatives, but also questions of client in
terests versus interests of others.
A rule of informed consent may lead to increased harm to third
parties in two ways. First, a rule of informed consent may cause fear of
malpractice suits because of refusal to follow a client's directions. This
fear could result in additional pressure on lawyers to violate ethical
norms, particularly in those situations where the client's requests are
legal but arguably immoral or unethical. Second, a rule of informed
consent could further reinforce the ideology that a lawyer has no
moral responsibility for the consequences of his or her professional
actions.
The assumption underlying the first concern is that clients, be
cause of their own self interest, want their lawyers to engage in unethi
cal behavior and will instruct their lawyers to act accordingly. This
assumption may be wrong. Lawyers may impute selfish ends and mo
34. Another harmful effect is related to this idea that in a significant part of the legal
profession informed consent is unnecessary. Here the argument would be that imposing a
rule of informed consent upon the legal profession as a whole has significant costs. Some of
the costs are administrative, incurred in enforcing the rule; other costs stem from the way
the issue would arise in litigation, particularly because such a rule encourages retrospective
evaluation of decisions. Therefore, it is too costly to try and "isolate the few cases in which
the doctrine [WOUld] assist a plaintiff who deserves to recover." Epstein, Medical Malprac
tice: The Case for Contract, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 87, 125. Evaluating the cost
argument is beyond the scope of this article. A few comments, however, can be made. The
argument about cost is similar to those made in the medical profession. If one finds it
persuasive there, one would probably find it persuasive with regard to the legal profession.
However, if the thesis that corporations control their clients tips the balance on the cost
question, then an issue arises of whether the appropriate response is rejection of the rule of
informed consent or creation of different rules for different segments of the profession.
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tives to their clients too often.3s If informed consent were to cause
lawyers to discuss such issues with their clients and discover that cli
ents did not want their lawyers to engage in ethically suspect behavior,
then it could lead to less harm rather than more.
This possibility that informed consent might reduce unethical be
havior must contend, however, with the' second concern about the im
pact of a rule of informed consent: its effect on the ideology of the
profession. The question of informed consent's impact on ideology
seems particularly important when we consider corporate lawyering.
It is in this sphere of practice that scholars argue that the lawyer per
forms a mediating function between the selfish instincts of the client
and the needs of society. 36
Under this view, the corporate lawyer both refers to the law and
to principles of public policy and justice in giving advice. Hence the
corporate lawyer "plays a crucial role in pushing business toward so
cially responsible behavior."37
If it is true that corporate lawyers have performed this mediating
function, then the effect of informed consent could be to diminish this
role. Imposing a doctrine of informed consent could further tilt the
balance toward lawyer as mouthpiece rather than lawyer as spokesper
son for society's norms. This argument is similar to the general argu
ment that informed consent is inappropriate for all "true"
professionals. Professionals, it is argued, adhere to a set of internalized
norms that include commitment to a client's best interests and quality
services. By questioning these professional motives, informed consent
may decrease the likelihood of these internalized norms developing
because they will no longer be part of the professional's self- definition.
This argument about self-definition becomes more focused when
it is applied to lawyers. The question here is whether the effect of the
doctrine of informed consent will be to internalize further the norm of
lawyer as the spokesperson for the client at the expense of the norm of
lawyer as transmitter of society's values. Moreover, it is particularly in
35. See Simon, The Ideology ofAdvocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics,
1978 WIS. L. REV. 29, 53-59.
36. See, e.g., Gordon, The Ideal and the Actual in the Law: Fantasies and Practices of
New York City Lawyers, 1870-1910, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POST
CIVIL WAR AMERICA 51 (G. Gawalt ed. 1984) [hereinafter Gordon, The Ideal and the
Actual in the Law]; Kagen & Rosen, supra note 23. This image of lawyer as mediator has
had two audiences: the public at large and corporate lawyers. What I am concerned with
here is how adoption of a rule of informed consent would affect this second audience 
corporate lawyers themselves.
37. Kagan & Rosen, supra note 23, at 409-10. See also Gordon, supra note 7, at 274
75.
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the corporate sphere that commentators have discussed the image of
lawyer as spokesperson for societal interests. 38
There are reasons for rejecting this vision of lawyers as spokesper
sons for society's interests. However, assuming that this is a desirable
role for corporate lawyers, it is precisely this image of lawyer as medi
ator between private and public interests that Heinz and Laumann
have attempted to rebut. If Heinz and Laumann are correct, the cor
porate lawyer currently is not performing this role of mediator. We
may lament this conclusion, but our question about informed consent
then becomes one of whether acceptance of informed consent would
block change in the future. By further reinforcing the ideology of cli
ent control, informed consent may eliminate debate about alternative
models.
Looking to the past provides insight about the validity of this pos
sibility, because the idea that the corporate lawyer had the dual func
tions of being spokesperson both for his or her client and for society's
values developed at the end of the nineteenth century. Robert Gordon
has explored the attempt of New York City elite lawyers from 1870 to
1910 to construct an ideal science of the law which would reconcile
public demands with the clients' private needs. He concluded that this
project failed even though its proponents truly believed in the effort
they were attempting. 39
If Gordon is correct about the failure of turn of the century elite
lawyers to reconcile conflicting private and public aims, it appears un
likely that such a vision would work under the changed conditions of
today.40 Therefore, rejection of the application of informed consent
because it may prevent development of a more responsive ideology for
corporate lawyers is not warranted. Without other changes, such an
alternative ideology would not develop anyway.
Moreover, the best way to implement public goals may not be
through lawyers' attempts to override their clients' decisions. This as
sumes that the lawyer is in a better position than the client to decide
questions of fair dealing and equity, but there is nothing about the
38. This is not surprising given that it seems harder to make virtue out of the neces
sity to represent your client's interests when your client is a large corporation than when
your client is an individual. Adding the possibility of being a mediating influence makes it
easier to justify one's role as advocate.
39. Gordon states, "For the most part corporate lawyers did little more than select
and in some instances devise the most legally defensible and advantageous forms through
which decisions already made could be executed." Gordon, The Ideal and the Actual in the
Law, supra note 36, at 78.
40. See Kagan & Rosen, supra note 23, at 423-30.

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

150

[Vol. 9:139

selection and training of a lawyer that supports this assumption. In
deed, lawyers' preoccupation with rules and procedural regularity may
lead to a one-sided view of morality.41 Furthermore, allowing lawyers
this license implies that moral problems are somehow capable of tech
nical resolution. 42
The concern, however, about ideology and its relationship to the
power of corporate lawyers and their clients to do harm is not mis
placed. I agree with the views of Professors Rhode and Schwartz that,
at a minimum, we should be looking for ways to change the prevailing
professional ideology which grants lawyers immunity from moral crit
icism as long as they break no law or professional rule. Instead, law
yers should assume moral responsibility for the consequences of their
actions. 43 Paradoxically, I believe that informed consent could playa
role in bringing about such a change.
Professionals generally have viewed informed consent as a formal
requirement that can be satisfied by the obtaining of signatures on
forms. Professor Katz's vision is different; he argues that it can be
come a way of promoting dialogue between professional and client. If
informed consent can become a way of promoting dialogue then it
may lead to change. 44 At present, the separation of responsibility be
tween ends and means allows both lawyer and client to disclaim re
sponsibility for the consequences of the lawyer-client relationship.45 A
conversation about the effects of different decisions would make it
harder for either side to disclaim responsibility. They cannot claim
they did not know.
.
More importantly, informed consent questions the dominance of
professional role. It does not accept the claim that the professional is
entitled to make decisions because of specialized knowledge that is in
accessible to the client, and it does not accept the professional claim
that the lawyer can be trusted to act always in the best interests of the
client. By eroding these claims of professionalism, informed consent
can lead to questioning the professional retreat to role as justification
for engaging in what would otherwise be immoral behavior.
Cf J. SKHLAR, LEGALISM (1971).
See Post, On Professional Prerogatives, 37 STAN. L. REV. 459,463 (1985).
See Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 643
(1985); Schwartz, Comment on Rhode, 37 STAN. L. REV. 653, 653 (1985).
44. See Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking, supra note 3.
41.

42.
43.

45. Dauer and Leff have characterized the situation this way: "Client: "Thats up to
my lawyer (and anyway I can't be responsible since I don't understand all that stuff):
Lawyer: 'The choices aren't mine and the system demands that I protect my client:"
Dauer & Leff, Correspondence: The Lawyer as Friend, 86 YALE L.J. 573, 583 n.4O (1977).
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LAWYERS AND PROFESSIONAL AUTONOMY
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This argument is not one based on logical necessity. It is possible
that some professional prerogatives could be denied and still the pro
fessional would hold on to a claim of role differentiated morality.
However, it would make it harder to justify the claims of professional
ism based on the pretense that the lawyer, as professional, has some
special claim to doing good by assuming responsibility for client ac
tions. Informed consent may restore focus to the question of how the
lawyer can do good, or at least less harm, by assuming responsibility
for his or her own actions.
By itself, however, informed consent is unlikely to accomplish
this acceptance of responsibility. It must be accompanied by other
changes. Although this symposium is not the place for a full discus
sion of other possible changes, I will mention two. First, at a mil1;i
mum, changes in the provisions of professional regulations must be
made. The Code of Professional Responsibility attempts to set out as
pirational standards, but the structure of the Code vividly communi
cates that adherence to these standards is discretionary and the subject
of individual choice. 46 The Model Rules eliminate the tripartite struc
ture of the Code, but aim only to set out minimum enforceable stan
dards. 47 The legal profession needs a structure which communicates
that these rules are meant to be both .enforceable and more stringent
than the Model Rules. 48 Changes are needed which impose upon law
yers a greater accountability for their own behavior.49
Second, however, the studies of corporate lawyering have shown
that ideology is only part of the picture. Change in ideology without
attention to structural aspects of the profession is unlikely to accom
plish anything. The whole point of Heinz and Laumann's study is that
representing corporate clients is different in significant ways than rep
resenting individual clients. Therefore we should seriously consider
having different rules for different segments of the profession. 50 This is
necessary not only because corporations have more power than most
46. See Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking, supra note 3, at 1013.
47. See Rhode, supra note 43, at 647.
48. It is easy to argue that these changes will have little or no effect. However, as
Deborah Rhode has recently argued: "Whatever the likelihood of enforcement, a collective
affirmation of professional values may have some effect simply by supplying, or removing,
one source of rationalization for dubious conduct .... Conversely, standards pitched at a
more demanding level can reinforce the lawyer who would prefer the ethical course but is
reluctant to appear sanctimonious." Rhode, supra note 43, at 648.
49. Informed consent may allow more assumption of responsibility by lawyers be
cause of less concern of overreaching in terms of controlling clients.
50. The suggestion of developing different rules for different segments of the profes
sion is not new. See, e.g., Bellow & Kettleson, From Ethics to Politics Confronting Scarcity
and Fairness in Public Interest Practice, 58 B.U.L. REV. 337 (1978); Rhode, supra note 43,
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individuals but because a corporate entity is not an individual. Rules
based upon an individual's right to autonomy may make no sense
when transferred to an organizational settingY
CONCLUSION
Professor Katz's book teaches us that we cannot change legal
rules to increase client participation and expect professionals to follow
those rules without taking account of the historical and psychological
underpinnings of professional dominance. The corporate control thesis
teaches us that we cannot think about the issues of client autonomy
and professional control without being aware of the structural and ide
ological context of the professional-client relationship. In both cases,
however, the answer to the difficulties presented is not to abandon cli
ent autonomy; it is to confront the difficulties directly. In medicine this
means dealing with the psychological barriers to sharing decisionmak
ing power; in law this means putting limits on lawyers participating in
behavior that harms others. For what we need is not professional con
trol over clients, but professional responsibility for one's own actions.

at 606-08 (discussing opposition to providing different treatment for organizations and indi
viduals during drafting of Model Rules).
51. Rhode, supra note 43.

